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Abstract 
Italian State-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to occupy a strategic position in the national economy. 
In 2013, their aggregate value added was equal to 17% of the Italian national GDP, and they counted for 
around 40% of the total Italian stock market capitalization. The present paper focuses on the top ten 
Italian SOEs over the period 2004-2013. A first overview of the changes in their internal and external 
environment suggests the crucial importance of institutional conditions and the lack of a coherent policy 
design for privatisation and regulation, as the timing and the intensity of the reforms has varied deeply 
among sectors. Nevertheless, contemporary Italian SOEs have been increasingly exposed to market 
incentives, and they seem nowadays more oriented to markets than to public values, with some 
remarkable divergences depending on the degree of public control and market liberalization. Our textual 
analysis of the SOEs’ statutes reveals a total absence of direct references to a formal public mission. Social 
goals have been increasingly addressed by means of regulation, while only Ferrovie dello Stato and Poste 
Italiane are formally subject to the Universal Service Obligation. We also find that, on average, the 
management and performance of the Italian SOEs has improved and it holds the comparison with private 
and public European industry peers. Still, remarkable differences across markets and across sectors 
persist. Listed SOEs are largely profitable and distribute positive dividends to their shareholders. Among 
them, Eni, Enel and Finmeccanica have expanded their business internationally, though cross-border 
M&As. As a result, a high share of their revenues and employees originates out of Italy. This suggests that 
their strategies are no more committed to political goals, such as employment protection. Conversely, 
other SOEs are somehow compelled to maintain an informal public mission. Unlisted SOEs that provide 
universal services often incur in economic losses which are partly covered by public subsidies or by 
taxpayers.Nevertheless they also have modernized their management and expanded into new profitable 
markets, such as high speed train (FS) and financial and insurance services (Poste Italiane). SOEs managing 
networks have invested in national strategic infrastructures and their employees and revenues are largely 
domestic-based. Finally, aggregate data do not reveal strong divergences among the Italian SOEs and their 
industry peers in terms of employment policies and labor productivity, with some important divergences 
among SOEs operating in labor-intensive and capital-intensive sectors. In terms of investments in fixed 
assets we observe divergences among SOEs and private ones. The former have increased their 
investments in tangible assets over time, while investments by private industry peers have been 
negatively affected by the financial crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
In spite of the wave of privatization, the Italian government has been keeping some strategic enterprises under its control. 
In 2013, 5% of the 1,523 major Italian enterprises3 was controlled by a public – central or local – entity. Their aggregate 
value added corresponded to 17% of the Italian GDP (1.62 bln euros at current prices in 2013). This first picture suggests 
that SOEs still cover a relevant position in the Italian economy, especially in the sectors of general interest, where they 
are the top enterprises in terms of revenues, assets and number of employees (table 1).  
 
Table 1 - Major enterprises in Italy by ownership and sector – summary data (bln €, 2013) 
  Freq. Turnover Assets Employees 
All Sectors     
Private enterprises 1,453 808.10 936.32 2,441,690 
SOEs 70 308.36 657.14 582,403 
Total enterprises  1,523 1,116.47 1,593.46 3,024,093 
Share of public enterprises 5% 28% 41% 19% 
Production, distribution and trade of electricity and gas 
Private enterprises 25 26.43 31.05 11,326 
SOEs 23 141.59 255.01 122,805 
Share of public enterprises 48% 84% 89% 92% 
Petroleum fuels, natural gas, mineral oils and petrochemicals  
Private enterprises 22 61.67 28.20 13,654 
SOEs 2 115.47 138.38 82,879 
Share of public enterprises 8% 65% 83% 86% 
Transportation (Airlines, shipping, road and rail transport undertakings and ancillary) 
Private enterprises 41 20.58 19.20 54,730 
SOEs 5 9.03 65.73 82,660 
Share of public enterprises 11% 31% 77% 60% 
Public services (water, airports, motorways, waste collection and postal services) 
Private enterprises 8 3.42 10.64 15,603 
SOEs 24 14.51 149.11 175,942 
Share of public enterprises 75% 81% 93% 92% 
Broadcasting and media (including advertising, film and theatre) 
Private enterprises 5 8.10 12.57 15,291 
SOEs 1 2.65 2.31 11,473 
Share of public enterprises 17% 25% 16% 43% 
Vehicles, aerospace, defence and security     
Private enterprises 41 136.63 154.14 345,265 
SOEs 3 20.39 38.97 84,478 
Share of public enterprises 7% 13% 20% 20% 
Electronics     
Private enterprises 36 13.44 14.30 51,352 
SOEs 1 1.42 1.27 9,464 
Share of public enterprises 3% 10% 8% 16% 
Source: own elaboration on Mediobanca 2014 and Amadeus 
Note: data are limited to the top 1,500 Italian enterprises with an annual turnover higher than 50 mln euros 
 
Contemporary SOEs are fundamentally different from traditional Italian SOEs that flourished in the twentieth century. 
Indeed, during the last two decades, SOEs have undergone some major internal and external reforms. They have 
reformed their legal status, they have been increasingly corporatized and subjected to a private law regime. Some of 
them have been listed on a stock exchange market and partially opened to private equity, becoming mixed public-private 
enterprises where the Italian government keeps the majority of shares. In some cases, direct public control has been 
substituted by an indirect ultimate control. As a result, their management and corporate structure have been re-
organized and increasingly exposed to market incentives. The external environment where SOEs operate has been 
changing as well. While SOEs used to provide goods and services under a legal monopoly, nowadays they operate in 
liberalized markets open to international competition. 
In the light of the major internal and external changes, one can wonder whether corporatized SOEs competing in 
deregulated and globalized markets have improved their performance and have re-oriented their market strategy and 
economic behaviour accordingly to the market incentives they have been increasingly exposed to. These reforms bring 
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us also to question whether contemporary SOEs are managed the same way as private companies or whether they still 
preserve some features of traditional SOEs in terms of public mission and general interest objectives. We address these 
research questions by analysing the 10 major Italian SOEs controlled by the Italian central government according to the 
following outline. Box 1 describes the approach adopted to select the 10 major Italian SOEs, and shortly introduces their 
core business and activity. Section 2 offers an historical overview of the Italian SOEs, focusing on the evolution of the 
institutional framework governing them, and describes the change in the portfolio of enterprises owned by Italian central 
government. Section 3 discusses how the external environment where SOEs operate has been reformed, namely market 
liberalization and the introduction of regulation. In section 4 we restrict the focus on the major Italian SOEs which 
constitute the core of our analysis and we recall the internal reforms that have modified their structure and organization. 
In order to discuss whether new SOEs behave like private enterprises or still pursue social goals, section 5 first offers a 
brief overview of the concept of public mission and reviews the main related literature. Then, it analyses whether and 
how a public mission is displayed in SOEs’ formal documents (section 5.1) and the SOEs’ position with respect to the  
universal service obligation (section 5.2). Section 6 moves to analyse the ten major Italian SOEs in terms of economic 
performance, investments and portfolio strategies to infer whether their behaviour differs with respect to private 
enterprises and can somehow be linked to an informal public mission. For this purpose, we will mainly analyse budget 
and balance-sheet data over the period 2004-2013, and we will compare the Italian SOEs with some selected European 
private and state-owned industry peers. We first assess whether modern Italian SOEs are profitable, whether they are 
budgetary autonomous and independent or if they still rely on public subsidies. We will assess what is their impact on the 
national public finances by comparing the dividends from the SOE to the central governments with the economic transfers 
from the governments to its SOEs (section 6.1). By surveying the firms’ M&As we will discuss the change in the firm’s core 
business, and to which extent the Italian SOEs have internationalized, by expanding their business beyond national 
borders after markets have been liberalized. In this way we try to infer whether, after being reorganized and increasingly 
exposed to market incentives, modern SOEs show an improved entrepreneurial attitude (section 6.2). Next, we analyse 
their approach towards the issue of employment: Are SOEs used by the government to support employment? Have they 
improved their labour productivity? Does their approach towards employment strongly diverge from their private 
benchmark? (section 6.3). Moreover, since the presence of a major controlling public shareholder is likely to ensure 
stability to the firm, we will discuss whether firms’ strategies are more likely to be short-run or long-run oriented. Then, 
we look at the level of investments by tracing the trend of their fixed assets, with a particular focus on investments in 
R&D (section 6.4). Then, we discuss how the principal-agent relation has been effectively implemented: whether and how 
public majority shareholder exercises its controlling power, an area where the appointment of top managers and directors 
represents the major aspect. Finally, section 7 draws some conclusions from previous analysis on the SOEs attitude 
towards some economic and social issues. 
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2. State ownership in Italy: The historical background and emergent trends. 
As in many other late-industrialized countries, the role of the state in the Italian economy had been massive throughout 
the XX Century. In particular, SOEs had represented not only the main instrument of economic governance for network 
industries, but also important actors in sectors such as finance and manufacturing.  
The rise of state intervention in the Italian economy occurred in separate waves. The first large-scale nationalization was 
enacted in 1905, as the government led by Antonio Giolitti took over main railway concessions from private operators, 
which merged into Ferrovie dello Stato (FS). While the First World War facilitated close relationships among the State and 
business (Grifone 1971), it is only after the Great Depression that the state decided to take over assets of the main 
financial and industrial groups. These had been collected within the Istituto di Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), a 
conglomerate with private-law forms but directly controlled by the state established in 1933 to relief financial institutions 
from the burden of industrial assets and, at the same time, re-launch industrial policy in crucial sectors such as steel, 
electricity and shipbuilding (Castronovo 2012).  
Box 1 – The 10 major Italian SOEs and their core business 
 
To select the Italian major SOEs we first consider all Italian SOEs with an annual turnover higher than 50 mln euros. 
Then, we exclude from our sample the public enterprises controlled by municipalities or other local entities. Thus, 
we focus only on the SOEs controlled by the central government. Then, we have ranked these SOEs in terms of 
turnover, assets and number of employees. Finally, we have selected only those SOEs which are simultaneously 
reported in all the three sub-groups. This procedure has brought us to identify these ten Italian SOEs: Eni, Enel, 
Finmeccanica, Poste Italiane, Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), Snam, RAI, Terna, and STMicroelectronics. They operate in 
different sectors, but mainly in sectors of general interest, characterized by network industries. 
ENEL is the former monopolistic national energy provider. After market liberalization it has reduced its market share 
and it has been vertically disintegrated, as it does not own and manage anymore the energy transmission grid. It 
continues to be the largest Italian energy company and operates in the production, distribution, and final retail of 
electricity and gas, especially in Europe and in South America.  
ENI is the national champion in the oil and gas sector with several subsidiaries around the world and the highest 
revenues among the cases considered. It is an oil company engaged in the exploration, production, transportation, 
transformation, and marketing of oil and natural gas. Moreover, it is active in the refining and marketing of 
petroleum and chemical products. In addition, it engages in the offshore and onshore hydrocarbon field 
construction and in drilling.  
SNAM is the main Italian operator for the transport and dispatching of natural gas and the only Italian operator that 
re-gasifies liquefied natural gas. After the unbundling from ENI, SNAM owns and manages the natural gas pipelines 
and operates into highly regulated markets. 
TERNA is the company that owns and manages the electricity transmission grid. It is the result of the unbundling of 
the network from ENEL and it is organized as a holding and control different operative societies corresponding to 
the different activities in the management of the electric network. It operates under a natural monopoly condition 
and its economic activity is highly regulated.  
FINTECNA is a holding that controls several societies in the real estate sector and FINCANTIERI, a society in the 
defense, security and vehicle sector. FINCANTIERI operates mainly in the shipping and in the constructions and is 
mainly based in Italy.  
FINMECCANICA is a holding in the defense, security and vehicle sector. Its subsidiaries ALENIA AERMACCHI and 
AGUSTA WESTLAND are involved in the development, design, and manufacture of aircraft, helicopters, satellites, 
missile systems and other equipment.  
FERROVIE DELLO STATO is the holding that collects RETE FERROVIARIA ITALIANA, the owner of the about 16,200 
kilometers (10,000 miles) of track, and TRENITALIA, the operating company for the transport of passengers.  
POSTE ITALIANE is structured as a holding that puts together subsidiaries acting in quite different services. Apart 
from the postal services operated by POSTE ITALIANE and SDA EXPRESS COURIER, the holding controls different 
societies in the postal savings, financial activities and also telecommunications. It has also insurance and real estate 
companies (POSTE VITA, POSTE ASSICURA, EUROPA GESTIONI IMMOBILIARI).  
RAI is the broadcasting company charged with the public service. It is organized as a holding that collects societies 
in the movie, advertising, internet and broadcasting grid networks.  
STMicroelectronics operate in the electronic and in the conductor market. 
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After the II World War, the economic intervention of the state definitely consolidated between the 1950s and the 1960s. 
In this period, the size and the role of state capitalism had been shaped by three major strategic decisions. The first 
concerned IRI’s strategy, which refocused on the support to country’s development by the provision of infrastructures 
and basic products for private manufactures (Wormald 1972; Barca and Trento 2010). The most profitable and 
technologically advanced among IRI’s subsidiaries were Autostrade and STET4. IRI’s network industries included also the 
Rome’s Airports and ALITALIA, the national airline company. Within IRI, a key role was played by heavy industry as in the 
case of enterprises producing steel (ILVA), ships (FINCANTERI) and defence and aerospace systems (FINMECCANICA). 
Besides, IRI acquired a number of other companies such as the national TV and radio Broadcaster, RAI, and retail 
enterprises such as SME and Autogrill. Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth to mention that IRI had shares 
in some of the most important financial institutions of the country. 
The second strategic decision relates to the oil and gas sector. In the aftermath of the war, the government was about to 
dismantle Agip, a SOE established in 1927 to promote oil exploration and extraction. Nonetheless, Enrico Mattei, the Agip 
CEO, conducted a successful lobbying campaign against the operation and, some years later, further developed the 
domain of the company. In 1953, Agip became subsidiary of the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI). ENI’s mission aimed at 
creating a vertically integrated oil and gas player. Its activities ranged from extraction and engineering to the actual 
distribution of fuel5.  
A third strategic decision was made in 1962, when the centre-left government led by Amintore Fanfani nationalized of 
the electricity sector. The new Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL) took over power stations and grids previously 
owned by private operators and started to expand the production capacity and the infrastructure to electrify the Italian 
territory. The main public mission was to promote the universal access to services throughout the whole country at 
reasonable fares for both individual customers and firms, irrespectively of diversified fixed and marginal costs. Along with 
FSI, nationalised in 1905, ENEL, ENI and IRI constituted a highly relevant component of the Italian economy in terms of 
size, sectors covered and investments made (Amoroso and Olsen 1978; Barca and Trento 2010). Figure 1 gives an 
overview of the sectors covered by these four SOEs in the decade before major privatization. In this period, Italian SOEs 
were run under the public-law, they were Enti pubblici a carattere economico, to mean a kind of corporation that, 
although separated from government in terms of accounting, was ultimately part of the state. The governance of this 
network was not based on ownership basis of the Treasury. On the contrary, several government departments such as 
Industry, Public Enterprises, Telecommunications shared coordination powers with the Treasury. Often, such a 
collaboration took the form of interdepartmental committees, such as those responsible for economic planning and the 
setting of fares for public services delivery.  
 
Figure 1. Systemic governance of Italian SOEs before privatisations 
 
Legend: thick vertical line means “control” (ex. The Ministry of Transportation controls FS). 
 
Such a system underwent a radical change during the 1990s. In 1992, the emergence of a joint financial and monetary 
crisis pushed national policy makers to design and implement a drastic cut back of public assets culminating in 1999 with 
the privatization of IRI’s Autostrade and STET6. Others less profitable IRI’s companies have been reassembled in FINTECNA 
and transferred to the Treasury. IRI’s dismantling was part of a larger design that Beniamino Andreatta – foreign minister 
in 1994 – negotiated with the European Commission to cope with both the Italian public debt and compatibility of IRI 
with Common Markets rules on state’s aids after the Maastricht’s Treaty (Artoni 2014). A first look to the new governance 
of SOEs shows a pivotal role played by the Treasury, which became by far the most important department, controlling 
SOEs by shareholder powers grounded in private law. Indeed, the Italian SOEs reformed their legal form and they were 
corporatized. Previous public-law entities turned into joint stock companies, Società Per Azioni (SpA) in Italian, allowing 
the separation of their budget from that of the State and from the composition of the public debt.  Among the newly 
                                                          
4 The former was the franchisee of the main toll motorway trunk connecting Milan to Neaple, while the latter was the main national telecommunication 
operator. 
5 Progressively, ENI added businesses in the chemical industry, as in the 1970s it merged with Montedison, the main private player in Italy, and acquired 
corporations in manufacturing such as Nuovo Pignone, a Florence-based enterprise active in the production of turbines and compressors, and the textile 
company Lanerossi (Grant et al 1989; Sapelli and Carnevali 1992).  
 
6 Conversely, the privatization of ALITALIA has been implemented in many steps and completed in 2009. 
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corporatized Italian SOEs, some remained totally owned by the state (FS, POSTE, RAI, FINTECNA), while others underwent 
partial privatization and have been listed to the stock market, with the Treasury keeping a role as key shareholder (ENI, 
ENEL, FINCANTIERI).  
 
Figure 2. Systemic governance of Italian SOEs in 2013 
 
Legend: thick vertical line means “control” (ex. The Ministry of Treasury controls FS). 
 
During the following decade, such a pattern underwent a further reshuffling, with the emergent involvement of Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), a state-controlled financial institution managing postal savings and providing financial services 
on behalf of the state and local governments. In 2003, the government corporatized CDP7, allowing it to acquire shares 
in strategic enterprises on the condition that these were economically and financially viable. Over the last decade, CDP 
took over relevant shares of SOEs formerly owned by the Treasury, and after the grid unbundling in the network industries 
CDP has become the major shareholder of national grid operators - Terna (electricity) and Snam (gas). This phenomenon 
partially restructured the governance of SOEs in a more polycentric arrangement and has been underpinned by a mix of 
financial, legal and industrial drivers. First, CDP has always had a crucial importance in the management of State’s debt. 
In fact, the huge amount of postal savings it manages have been mainly deployed for investments of both the State and 
local governments. After 2003, the possibility for CDP to take over shares of SOEs introduced for the government a further 
instrument to expand its current assets at need without “real” privatization or pure nationalization. In turn, CDP has had 
the possibility to set up a portfolio of investments with a solid anchor in the network industries (mainly the gas and 
electricity grids, respectively SNAM and TERNA), providing a good risk/return ratio for its shareholders (Battilossi 2014, 
pp. 87-92; la Repubblica 2013, 28). A further rationale behind CDP involvement in the network industries concerns the 
legal basis of market opening in these sectors. In this sense, CDP ownership of SNAM and TERNA constituted a viable 
solution for the Italian State to unbundle the grid operators from the national incumbents while continuing to keeping 
indirect public control over strategic assets and preventing them from being privatized. 
The next section will further develop such a dimension of the institutional change, emphasizing how the unbundling 
process is pushing SOEs to re-focus their strategies on more regulated businesses, while the original public mission of 
these companies has been progressively taken over by the overall sectorial regulation. A third and not less important 
driver of CDP involvement in SOEs relates to the development of an industrial policy in strategic sectors. In fact, the initial 
idea that market regulation and privatization would have also been the optimal solution for industrial growth has been 
gradually replaced by a more pragmatic approach towards the potential role of the state. Under this perspective, the 
2008 financial crisis represented the juncture that allowed CDP to effectively implement state’s comeback to economic 
policy making (Financial Times, 2012, 17; Salvemini 2014, p. 290). However, it should be noted that such an involvement 
does not seem to reproduce a new IRI, as some commentators claimed. Differently from IRI, CDP does not use public 
money and cannot by statute invest in loss-making companies. From an industrial perspective, if state involvement in 
sectors such as Telecommunication and Motorways underwent a relevant retreat, the new role assigned to CDP seems 
to highlight the emergence of a new wave of state intervention and industrial policy. 
 
3. Market building and regulation  
The major changes that affected the Italian SOEs and their corporate governance have been accompanied by no less 
important reforms of the markets in which they operate. Indeed, the liberalization of service markets restructured SOE’s 
environment in two different components: a de-regulated, competitive environment, and highly regulated sectors where 
SOE’s acts without economic competition and the State provides sector regulation as a public good for the guarantee of 
Universal Service Obligations.  
The liberalization of services of general economic interest (SGEI) has been driven by the European sectorial policies which 
broken up the former vertically integrated monopolies and opened them to market competition. Three main processes 
                                                          
7 Since its foundation, CDP had been a branch of the Treasury. A first reform occurred in the 1980s, as CDP acquired more organizational autonomy. 
The 2003’s reform transformed CDP i a limited company, with the Treasury holding a 80% stake, while the remaining 20% has been taken over by 
financial institutions controlled by local governments (s.c. Fondazioni Bancarie). 
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of market building were introduced at the EU level to foster competition and to protect costumers: 1) the unbundling of 
networks, i.e. the separation of network activities as natural monopolies from other more commercial activities such as 
production, trade, metering or sale, through the introduction of budgetary distinction between the controller of the 
network and the controller of the activities; 2) the opening of the market to non incumbents through the sell of licenses 
for the operation on the network; 3) the creation of independent regulatory agencies (IRA) at the national level, with 
different competencies over prices, costumer protection, service quality. The three reforms have not been implemented 
homogeneously across sectors. If we take a wider perspective, important differences can be found also in comparison 
with other countries due to some discretion in the European legislation according to the subsidiary principle. For example, 
as far as the unbundling of networks is concerned, ENEL and ENI were forced to separate the budget, the organization 
and the ownership of networks, though with different timing,  while the French EDF is still a vertically integrated company. 
Instead, the unbundling in railway is limited to budget; it is related to the existence of postal offices in posts and though 
difficult to be implemented, and it is lacking in broadcasting.  
Similarly, the levels of opening of the market vary consistently: the market share of ENEL  in the wholesale energy market 
is lower than 30% (while EDF’s market share is higher than 80%), while other sectors are much more concentrated even 
after liberalisation of the access (railways and post in particular). The degree of public control varies significantly among 
sectors and countries: The Italian government has completely privatized Telecom, it owns 30% of ENEL share (while the 
French government owns around 80% of EDF), and it control the 100% of FS and Poste Italiane.  Finally, the institution of 
national Independent Regulatory Agency was very diverse regarding the timing, the powers and the existence itself of 
the authority (without considering the varying degrees of formal independence). For example, the national authority for 
gas and electricity, the AEEG, was soon introduced and gained through time more powers and independence also from 
the influence of the national government, which repeatedly tried to limit the AEEG intervention (La Spina and Cavatorto 
2008). Not the same can be said regards the AGCOM and its Regional branches, often considered weak in their 
interventions and politicised in their composition (Caretti 2010), but recently charged also for the regulatory functions of 
the postal service, with the personnel and competences coming from the Ministry (as in the case of the competence for 
water, attributed to the AEEG in 2011). At the same time, the national authority was only very recently introduced in 
railways (2011).  
The OECD indicators – which measures the intensity of the market reforms against 4 variables reported in the table below 
– offer a quite straightforward information on the heterogeneity of the market reforms among sectors   
 
Table 2. Intensity of market reforms among sectors 
  overall Entry Market structure Vertical integration Public ownership 
  1991 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 
Telecoms 6,0 0,6 0,4 0,0 0,0 1,7 1,3 - - 0,0 0,0 
Electricity 6,0 3,4 1,4 2,3 0,0 3,0 0,0 4,5 0,0 3,6 1,9 
Gas 6,0 2,3 1,9 0,0 0,0 3,0 0,8 4,7 1,9 1,6 1,8 
Post 5,8 4,3 3,3 2,0 1,0 6,0 4,0 - - 5,0 5,0 
Rail 6,0 3,1 2,8 2,0 2,0 1,5 0,0 3,0 3,0 6,0 6,0 
Source: OECD ETCR dataset ; Note: indicators are normalized between 0 and 6 with 6 being the smallest grade and 0 being the largest grade in terms 
of reforms; Entry: measures the presence of barriers to entry the market, where 0 represents the lowest level of entry barriers and 6 the highest level; 
Market structure: market share of the largest company, where 6 indicates a market share higher than 90% and 0 a share lower than 50%; Vertical 
Integration: 0, 3 and 6 correspond rispectively to ownership separation, Legal/Accounting separation and no separation; Public ownership: graded 6 in 
case of 100% public ownership and 0 in case of no public ownership; Overall: average of the grades attached against the other criteria 
 
These differences may suggest the absence of a coherent political design towards the transformation of some constitutive 
aspects of the public enterprises, namely of the public mission itself. The different intensity and timing of the liberalisation 
and of the introduction of the regulatory institutions and tools also show the lack of a stable political orientation, at least 
in general. As the analysis will show, stable orientations are difficult to be found also considering each policy sector 
separately. Indeed, the different extent of liberalisation and of implementation of the different reforms may also depend 
on the actor configurations in the policy domain: following Asquer (2011), in the sectors where the national champions 
were stronger on the domestic market, the opening of the market was wider and the internationalisation of former 
national monopolies more pronounced. So, it is plausible that common lines of development (either pro-opening or 
conservative), when existing, can be seen only at sector level. 
As a result, market building and regulations impinged not only on the organizational structure of several SOE’s but also 
on their mission, as regulation separates Universal Service Obligation from former monopolies (see section 6.3).  
 
 
In the regulation of the energy sector, the Italian policy can be considered among the frontrunners in the process of 
liberalisation. The so-called Bersani law of 1999 (d. lgs. 79/1999, after the name of the Minister of Industry at the time) 
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introduced the network unbundling that culminated in the creation of TERNA as a separate organisation from ENEL. Since 
2004, TERNA owns the transmission network and operates as monopolist with the concession for the transmission 
activities. In 2013, TERNA’s shareholders do not include ENEL anymore, while state ownership has been restructured, as 
CDP took over Treasury’s shares. 
The Bersani law also opened the electricity distribution market to newcomers and imposed to the former monopolist 
Enel to sell energy plants. Moreover, it allowed the constitution of energetic market with the IPEX (Italian Power 
Exchange) that is managed in concession by the public GSE spa, since 2009. From 2007 on, private clients in the domestic 
market are allowed to choose their energy provider, thus completely liberalizing the sell of energy. 
Finally, in 1995 the National IRA named AEEG, namely the Italian Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas, was 
established with different regulatory and monitoring functions in relation to prices, protection of consumers and 
promotion of the quality of electric and gas services.  
The AEEG is one of the main actors also in the regulation of the gas sector. The d.lgs. 164/2000, also known as “Letta 
decree” opened the market to other players and the introduced the network unbundling. SNAM spa is now the owner of 
the gas network, though still partly controlled by ENI, the former vertically integrated monopolist in gas. As in the case of 
electricity, the distribution of gas at the local level is awarded after municipal concessions opened to different players for 
a long period of time.  
The resulting market format for both energy and gas is a form of oligopoly where ENEL and ENI remain the main actors 
at national level, now sided by the multi-utilities in the center-north of the country (A2A, IREN and HERA in particular).  
Transport is the other sector where the relevance of networks and the adoption of EU policies brought the most relevant 
changes from the original monopoly of Ferrovie dello Stato. The first changes are linked to the EU legislation on budgetary 
separation of the infrastructural network from the operation activities (see the Council directive 1991/440/CEE).  
Moreover, substantial market opening has been introduced by the commission in 2007 for freight and in 2010 for 
international passenger transport. In Italy, the implementation of the EU reforms started in 1998 and 1999 (dpr 277/1998 
and 146/1999). On the example of German reforms, the Infrastructure management, Rete Ferroviaria Italiana spa, has 
been kept within the national incumbent Ferrovie dello Stato, thus complying EU standards on separation at the minimum 
level. On the contrary, since 2000 the domestic market has been deregulated both for freight and national passenger 
routes. In parallel, local mobility services have been devolved to regions that received powers over planning and awarding 
concession (Di Giulio 2011).  
The introduction of an independent regulatory agency, though debated since 1996, is a recent phenomenon, as the 
Transport Authority was created only in 2012. This is responsible for the guarantee of competition and efficiency, for the 
control of prices, for the definition of quality standards, for the competitive tendering procedures and for the definition 
of a minimum standard for costumer protection standards. Moreover, the Authority is expected to pave the way for 
structural separation of the infrastructure management from FS and the implantation of competitive tendering for 
regional services. 
Postal services also underwent a process of liberalisation by receiving the EU legislation (dir. 97/67/CE on limitation to 
weight, 02/39/CE and 08/7/CE), notwithstanding the different type of network involved (organizational rather than 
infrastructural). In Italy, the first transformations where structural, turning the postal division of the Ministry first into a 
Ente pubblico economico in 1994 and hence into a joint stock company in 1998, POSTE ITALIANE spa. The liberalisation 
of the postal market was introduced gradually from 1999 and completed only in 2011. In that same year, the regulatory 
activities in the postal services were attributed to the AGCOM, the National Authority for the regulation of the 
Communications. Over the last decade, Poste Italiane underwent major corporate changes, expanding its domain far 
beyond the collecting and delivery of postal service. Building on a strong and constant demand for postal saving, the 
group developed strategies which strongly focused on financial and assurance services. 
In this complex process of market liberalisation, the case of broadcasting is one where the non-market component of the 
activities represents the most important part of the production of the former monopolist, the RAI, whose activity is mainly 
based on the provision of media products intended as “public services”. The sector was affected at first by the Television 
Without Frontiers act in 1989 and subsequent directives that were implemented in 1997, in 2004, in 2005 and in 2010. .  
In the remaining sectors of economic activity, the environment changes were linked to the progress of the economic 
integration and competition policies, with particular reference to the European legislation on anti-trust, cartels, mergers 
and state aids.  
 
4. The reformed SOEs 
Previous sections have described how the evolution of Italian SOEs is a complex phenomenon, encompassing features of 
both stability and change. On the one hand, public ownership has stably represented an important element of Italian 
political economy. Although privatizations culminated over the 1990s and the 2000s produced a state’s retreat in some 
sectors such as Motorways and Telecommunication, the overall public assets seemed to be resilient, as they still represent 
an important share of country’s economy. From a different point of view, nonetheless, the markets where Italian SOEs 
are currently involved have undergone significant changes toward higher degrees of contestability.  
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This section shows how the persistence of SOEs and the emerging of markets in previously closed sectors are strictly 
interwoven. SOEs adapted to the changing institutional and business environments through an intense re-structuring of 
their corporate governance. All of them, for instance, became joined stock companies and assumed an “holding” 
structure; this, in turn, eased several processes of unbundling. Moreover, some SOEs underwent a deeper change as they 
have been partially privatised and listed on the Italian stock market. As emerged in section 2, also the state restructured 
its strategy as a shareholder. In general, it gradually diluted its capital in some of the most profitable companies, such as 
Eni and Enel, and, in some cases, restructured its controlling power through CDP, which is taking over an increasing 
amount of public assets. Table 3 summarizes the main features concerning the corporate governance of our sample of 
SOEs. These differ with respect to the number of shares owned by the central government, the type of control (direct or 
indirect), the legal status and whether they are listed on the stock exchange. 
 
Table 3. A taxonomy of the major Italian SOEs 
SOE name Legal form Public-owned shares Type of control Listed  
Eni Private law company; Joint Stock company  25,76% CDP S.p.A. 
4,34% MEF 
Indirect: CDP S.p.A.  
Direct: MEF  
Listed since 1995  
Enel Private law company – Joint Stock company  25,5% MEF Direct: MEF  
 
Listed since 1999  
FS  Private law company – Joint Stock company  100% - MEF Direct: MEF  Unlisted 
Finmeccanica Private law company – Joint Stock company  30,2% - MEF Direct: MEF  Listed since 2000  
Fintecna Private law company – Joint Stock company  100% CDP S.p.A. Indirect: CDP S.p.A. Unlisted 
Poste Italiane Private law company – Joint Stock company  100% - MEF Direct: MEF Unlisted 
RAI Private law company – Joint Stock company  99,56% MEF Direct: MEF Unlisted 
Snam Private law company – Joint Stock company  30% CDP reti S.p.A. Indirect: CDP S.p.A. 
 
Listed since 2001 
Stmicroelectro
nics 
Private law company – Joint Stock company 27,5% STMicroelectronics 
Holding II BV 
 
Indirect: STMicroelectronic 
Holding II BV controlled by 
50% MEF  
Listed since 1994 
Terna Private law company – Joint Stock company  29,8% CDP RETI S.p.A. Indirect: CDP reti S.p.A. Listed since 2004 
 
The ten cases considered in this study are all joint stock companies and they are structured as holding companies, with 
the only exception of STMicroelectronics that is a limited liability company.  
The Ministry of Economy and Finance is the major shareholder of ENEL (with the 25% of the shares), FINMECCANICA 
(30%), and it wholly owns FERROVIE DELLO STATO, POSTE and RAI. Moreover, it indirectly controls the other companies 
- ENI, FINCANTIERI and FINTECNA, in SNAM, in TERNA and in STMicroelectronics - via  CDP and its subsidiaries.  
Some of the SOEs where the government is the major, but not unique shareholder, have been opened to private equity 
and listed in the Italian Stock Market. These SOEs are subject to the supervision of the Italian Authority CONSOB. POSTE 
and FS were recently in the rumors for an entrance in that market, but the listing is still on paper. This impressed a major 
change in the size and structure of Stock Market (Barucci and Pierobon 2007), where publicly owned enterprises which 
underwent only partial privatizations account today for the 40% of the whole capitalization (Consob 2013, p. 6). Notably, 
out of the SOEs we are focusing on, those who are listed (and their listed subsidiaries) overall count for 28% of the total 
Italian market capitalization (table 4).  
 
Table 4. Market capitalization of Italian SOES (bln euros, 2014) 
  Market capitalization % of total market capitalization 
Enel 34.87 7.49% 
Enel Green Power (controlled by Enel) 8.72 1.87% 
Eni 52.94 11.37% 
Saipem (controlled by Eni) 3.87 0.83% 
Fincantieri (controlled by Fintecna) 1.31 0.28% 
Finmeccanica 4.48 0.96% 
Ansaldo STS (controlled by Finmeccanica) 1.67 0.36% 
RAI WAY 0.86 0.19% 
Snam 13.91 2.99% 
Stmicroelectronics - - 
Terna 7.60 1.63% 
Total 130.24 27.96% 
Total Market Capitalization 465.80 100% 
Source: Borsa Italiana, LSEG market analysis; December 2014 
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4.1 The State as shareholder in Italian SOES: corporate governance and appointments   
As in other enterprises, the elements of the corporate governance structure the relationships between actors in the firm 
and influence the strategy of the firm. In the case of public enterprises, the analysis of some elements of the corporate 
governance serves to show how the public actor interprets his role as shareholder in the in the Board of Directors (BoD).  
Even though the appointment of directors formally pertains to a political choice, a central role in the governance of 
publicly owned enterprises is attribute directly to the offices of the Ministry for Economy and Finance, especially in those 
firms where it is direct shareholder. The MEF monitors the activities of all its corporations and exerts its rights as 
shareholder according to the civil law (i.e. it approves the balance, the appointment of directors, their wages, it may 
modify the bylaws). The MEF also enjoys powers in the form of “golden powers”, but only over extraordinary operations 
in enterprises in sectors as defence and national security, energy, transports and telecommunications.  
The firms in our sample are different basically for the number of the director directly or indirectly appointed in the BoD, 
and for the type of public shareholders who decides. Furthermore, the Italian legislation obliges to the publication of the 
wages of managers in publicly owned enterprises. Moreover, the unlisted SOEs have to contribute to the overall goals of 
the spending review and efficiency in management (ex. Directive of the MEF April, 24 and June, 24, 2013).  
The abovementioned directives define the eligibility criteria and the appointment procedures and also introduced 
limitation to the wages of delegated directors according to the s.c. “spending review” law n. 95, 2012.  
In addition to these rules, the SOE’s by laws define the shareholders rights and the procedures for the appointment of 
directors. Moreover, listed SOE’s have further obligations on corporate governance and transparency.  
As far as the number of appointments is concerned, the government jointly with the MEF appoint 6 members up to 9 in 
both the BoD of ENEL and ENI. In FINMECCANICA, the MEF appoints 7 up to 11 directors and expresses a further director 
deprived of the vote, to guarantee for the special safeguards state by law n. 474/1994. Moreover, the MEF directly 
nominates the whole BoD of FS (5 directors, in agreement with the Ministry of Transports) and of POSTE (5 directors). As 
far as the Rai is concerned, the MEF appoints only 2 directors up to 9, while the rest selected among MPEs by the 
parliament itself, according to a partisan logic. 
STMicroelectronics represents a further exception, since it is the only enterprise in our sample that adopts a dual model 
of corporate governance. The MEF appoints 3 members of the Supervisory Board and 1 member in the management 
board. Finally, CDP nominates respectively 5 up to 9 in TERNA and 5 up to 9 in SNAM. Directors remain in charge for three 
years. Hence, the privatisation of former public enterprises has shaped differently the corporate governance of each SOE; 
the public nature of the State as shareholder and the memory of the politicization of appointments in former public 
enterprises also imposed further obligations on transparency and limitations to management wages. In other words, the 
passing of time after privatisation may have changed some “privileged” rules for public shareholders, but it also have also 
made the picture much more complex.  
 
5. Public Mission: a brief introduction 
This deep corporate re-organization opens the arena to new research questions: Have they taken on the challenges of 
corporate re-organization and market competition as an opportunity to expand their business and improve their 
performance? Are modern SOEs managed the same way as private companies? Do SOEs still preserve some features of 
traditional SOEs in terms of public mission and general interest objectives? To address these research questions, this 
section introduces the concept of public mission. 
That a government-owned enterprise is required to pursue goals other than the maximization of profit (economic goals) 
to generate positive externalities for the social environment in which these are embedded (social goals) is now a generally 
accepted idea (Aharoni, 1981; OECD, 2005; Thynne, 1994; Wettenhall & Thynne, 2002). Social goals, such as welfare, 
social cohesion, equity, consumer protection and public interest outcomes, are the linchpin (the main raison d’être, 
according to Scott (2000)) that holds together the mission of an SOE. In turn, the mission provides overall strategic 
direction (Stevens, Moray, & Bruneel, 2014). Literature argues that the combination (mix) of (potentially competing) 
economic and social goals mirrors the hybridity of the public enterprises and shapes their behaviour and performance 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2011; Grossi & Thomasson, 2015; Walsh, Weber, & Margolis, 2003). According to Thynne (1994, 
p. 73), the biggest problem is “the need for an effective mix of commercial and social objectives: the need to recognize 
that, given their ‘publicness’ some companies, quite rightly, are unable to operate on a ‘competitively neutral’ footing 
vis-a-vis non-government companies”. 
The public mission is a good way to better understand the past and present features of contemporary public enterprises 
(Florio, 2014). However, the fact that there is no consensus on the meaning of the term itself – although it does seem to 
somewhat overlap with notions such as corporate social responsibility and public value, or theories like business ethics 
and stakeholder theory – poses a major challenge for analysing the ‘public mission’. This Section therefore takes a 
pragmatic look at the available evidence, and attempts to first clarify the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of public mission.  
To begin with, the research contributions that address the various types of public enterprises are not always consistent 
in their use of the term ‘public mission’ or similar, e.g., public purpose, collective purpose, social mission, public function 
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(see for an extensive analysis: Bozeman, 2007, p. 133; Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Wettenhall & Thynne, 2002). Hence, 
in this paper, ‘public mission’ is used as an umbrella term, while the public enterprises are broadly defined as “(a) the 
direct producers of public services, either through liberalized market arrangements or under franchised monopoly, (b) 
ultimately owned or de facto controlled by public sector entities, (c) having a public mission that can be identified in 
legislation, regulation, statutes, etc., (d) whose ownership in principle can be shifted to the private sector” (Ciriec & 
Bernier, 2014, p. 16). Following Preston and Post (1975), the scholars that coined the expression ‘public responsibility’, 
we have chosen to use the adjective ‘public’ rather than ‘social’ because it more truly reflects the notion of mission and 
the fact that the SOE operates within the specific context of public life. Here, the term ‘public mission’ is meant as an 
organization’s mission informed by context-specific public values. 
At an organizational level, the public mission encompasses disparate needs and values, those of the collective (society’s 
public values) and those of the individual (the individual’s public values), which find common ground purely because the 
values are divorced from pure market logic and from legal concerns. For a value to be called ‘public’, there has to be a 
collectivity, an aggregation level that can benefit from the protection of this value (de Bruijn & Dicke, 2006, p. 719). In 
the liberalized utility sectors examples of public values are consumer protection, universal services, reliability, safety, 
quality and affordability of the service (de Bruijn & Dicke, 2006).  
Values are enduring beliefs that influence the choices among available means and ends (Kernaghan, 2000, p. 95), although 
no organization of any kind is free to unilaterally choose either the means or the ends for operating in its specific task 
environment. Heath and Norman (2004, pp. 255-256) have identified five general categories of responsibilities imposed 
upon the SOE by the State, one of the key actors with the most influence on the task environment of these organizations: 
1. Macroeconomic. Several reasons can push SOEs into counter-cyclical spending during recessions, including the need 
to level out the business cycle; to create over-capacity and “make work” projects to stem unemployment and 
safeguard employment levels; and to keep inflation in check through wage and price controls. Moreover, the 
government can use the SOEs to help it to meet specific fiscal objectives.  
2. National interest. SOEs are often seen as the ‘house stewards’ of national industry, providing domestic firms with 
subsidized goods and services (especially energy) and guaranteed markets in which domestic suppliers take 
precedent over foreign suppliers. The SOEs are usually a strategic card of national interest, the government’s 
preferred channel for investment in sectors identified as national priorities, or to support the development of 
fledgling industries with the potential to enhance international competitiveness. The SOEs are also used to ensure 
that industries, information, and productive technology deemed essential to national security remain under state 
ownership and control. 
3. Redistribution. The state relies heavily on the SOEs to help achieve redistributive goals. This normally translates into 
refraining from the kind of price discrimination practices adopted by profit-maximizing private firms to ensure that 
the same services are delivered at the same price nationwide (e.g. postal service). 
4. Model employer. SOEs are cast in the role of model corporate citizens, obliged to ‘lead by example’ and to act as a 
‘pressure gauge’ for the private firms. This means that the SOE often offers higher wage rates, superior benefits (e.g. 
on-site daycare), better job security, or that it hires more women or members of disadvantaged minorities. 
5. Reduction of externalities. The production of positive externalities can be defined as the main social responsibilities 
of an SOE, even though the need to control negative externalities leads the state to keep certain SOEs firmly in the 
public sector domain. Above all, in the liquor and gambling industries, where the state monopolies act to prevent 
the private enterprises from producing “too much” of the relevant good. Likewise, the public ownership of industries 
with the potential to create catastrophic environmental externalities (such as uranium mining and refinement, 
nuclear energy generation, etc.). 
While there are many combinations in real-life practice, the above categories give an overall but not exhaustive idea of 
the ways the State affects the organizational strategies and practices of public enterprises, and the variety of values and 
issues that potentially fall within the remit of the public mission.  
Nonetheless, among other things, public values are, ‘by definition, never static’ and ‘inherently relative’ (Bognetti & 
Obermann, 2012; de Bruijn & Dicke, 2006, pp. 721-722). Moreover, according to de Bruijn and Dicke (2006, p. 720) “what 
is defined as a public value in a utility sector in one country may be labelled as ‘private’ in the same sector in another 
country. Or what is labelled as a public value in one period of time may be defined as private in another decade”. 
According to Carroll (1979) one consequence of this is that ‘the degree of organizational interest in the issues’ is ‘always 
in a state of flux’ (p. 501).  
Other contributions recognize that the SOE mission is also shaped by ‘country-specific institutional characteristics’ (Stan, 
Peng, & Bruton, 2014, p. 482), including ‘the dominant patterns of economic organization and control’ of the business 
systems (Hotho, 2014, p. 673; Lorrain, 2005) and the different national public-service traditions (Scott, 2000). It is widely 
believed that the current strengths and weaknesses of the organization of the markets, the industrial supply and the 
modalities of competition are the result of certain key choices made in the past (Lorrain, 2005, p. 260, emphasis in the 
original).  
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Based on the three dimensions of organizational publicness identified by the seminal book of Bozeman (1987), i.e., 
ownership (public, private, or nonprofit), funding (government grants versus consumer payments), and control (by 
political or market forces) (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2011), it is plausible to say that the SOE mission is shaped by these 
same three aspects. In Bozeman’s original model all three variables should be viewed as continuous rather than 
categorical. For example, ‘when government has the greatest influence, then the …. organization is more public. When 
government influence is diminished, the organization is more private’ (Emmert & Crow, 1987, p. 57). 
Therefore, adopting a ‘dimensional’ approach means that the SOE mission can be considered ‘public’ at different degrees 
(see Figure 10). The right-hand side of the continuum depicts the highest level of economic orientation (e.g., profit 
maximization), while the left side describes an economic orientation less central to organization’s mission. The two 
extreme situations and the two intermediary situations are the result of a mix of ownership, funding and control variables 
that cannot be predetermined. As a result, it is impossible to place a specific SOE in discrete categories, instead it needs 
to be characterized by its relative placement along the public-to-private focus continuum (ibidem). Likewise, it is 
impossible to establish which of the three dimensions of publicness is most important, and for which aspects of goal 
achievement.  
 
Figure 3. Continuum of mission publicness 
 
 
The literature abounds with studies that ask whether the SOE has the effective ability to reconcile concurrent economic 
and social objectives, summing up the ‘dual’ public mission challenge in four interrelated critical issues – mission drifts, 
clashing values, performance, and behaviour. Nonetheless, the results of these studies suggest conflicting reasons for the 
practical consequences of the dual mission.  
More recently, the thrust of the empirical research critics’ main argument is that regardless of the legal status under 
which the SOE formally operates, the driving force of its activities – especially in the case of market-listed public 
enterprises - is increasingly self-interest, e.g., market profitability rather than customer service or social responsibility 
(Wettenhall, 2001, p. 27). For instance, one needs only to look at the internationalization strategies of the big energy 
players (Soda, 2015); the use of market criteria in the scheduling of public TV programmes (Meier, 2003); the attempts 
of the public broadcasters to combine audience orientedness and public mission, ratings and quality (Celli & Balestrieri, 
2003; Meijer Costera, 2005); the tension between the innate territorial vocation of utilities tied to the community of 
reference; and the industrial-business vocation that focuses more on the intention to respond to market stimuli, meant, 
in the broadest sense, as the centre of all the opportunities (wherever these may be located) to enhance technical and 
commercial know-how and distinctive competences (Citroni, Lippi, & Profeti, 2012; Elefanti & Cerrato, 2008, p. 4  our 
translation; Giannelli, 2010). Hence, it is not unusual to see this tension progressively erode the public mission (Delponte, 
Sorrentino, Turri, & Vandone, 2014). 
One hypothesis is that the self-interest that is increasingly shaping the strategies and behaviours of the SOEs is due to 
the combined effects of the isomorphic (coercive and normative) dynamics set in motion by the respective task 
environments. One example of the isomorphic behaviour of the ten major Italian SOEs (see below) is their commitment 
(and claims) to a range of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, the undisputed domain and culture of the 
business world.     
Is the public mission thus set to become invisible because absorbed into the CSR actions of the contemporary SOE? In 
addressing the idea of publicness, however, we believe it important to treat the two notions on separate analytical and 
practical levels.  
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5.1  SOEs and Public Mission revisited 
Previous sections showed how SOEs face today an increasingly complex environment. If, on the one hand, they have been 
corporatized, partly privatized and brought to compete in liberalized markets, on the other, SOEs still represent actors 
with which national and local governments maintain privileged relations. 
It goes without saying thus, that also the public mission of these enterprises is expected to be influenced by such 
institutional and organizational changes, adapting their structures and strategies according with the reforms which, in 
each sector, re-defined the boundaries between the provision of public services and the commercial activities. While it is 
plain that the former represents a typical case of public mission, less clear is the meaning of SOEs involvement in de-
regulated markets. The emergence of a significant profit orientation of SOEs is in fact challenging with respect to the 
publicness of their original models. With this respect, we distinguish between a formal public mission that SOEs may be 
explicitly required to pursue from an informal public mission that may be deduced by analysing the SOEs behaviour and 
strategy in terms of profit destination; degree of internationalization, attitude towards the issue of employment; and 
propensity towards long-term investments and R&D. 
The following sub-section discuss whether the concept of public mission if formally embedded into the SOEs’ statutes 
and whether SOEs are formally subject to a universal service obligation 
 
5.2  Analysis of the SOEs statutes 
Our textual analysis of the statutes (articles of association) of the 10 companies investigated in the study reveals a total 
absence of direct references to their respective public missions. The average document length of the Articles, which set 
out the purpose of each company and how they are run, governed and owned, including the responsibilities and powers 
of the directors and other corporate bodies, is approximately 20 pages. However, none of the clauses on the purpose of 
each company shed much light on the public mission and, given that all the organizations in question are large-sized 
multibusiness operators, tend to be highly generic. Moreover, the language used in the Articles is not only the driest of 
dry technical jargon, but verges on the legalistic. 
After discovering that none of the information given in the Articles could enlighten us about any of the company-specific 
public missions, we examined the content provided by the official websites. Here, too, there were but two allusions to 
the PEs’ overall idea of the orientation to publicness:  
- the main stakeholders targeted by the web-driven communication; and 
- the methods used to communicate the respective missions and values, which are directed at the external 
environment. 
The main corporate communication targets of the PEs are the clients, the media, jobseekers, suppliers, investors, and 
consumer associations. The web pages of the “Company profile” or “Mission” sections generally deliver brief statements 
on recurring values, such as: corporate social responsibility (CSR), respect, ethics, trust, transparency, integrity, attention 
to people and their needs, commitment to innovation. Sustainability (with the emphasis on environmental issues) is the 
main focus of the institutional website content. The homepage menus of many of the companies investigated direct the 
user to sections dedicated to the corporate social responsibility initiatives launched in a variety of sectors through 
foundations and cultural and other projects, in Italy and abroad.  
On the topic of sustainability, Terna is the only company of the panel of ten that distinguishes among the different 
stakeholder categories, which it divides into the following groups: Regulators of licensed activities; Public decision makers 
and authorities; Shareholders; Lenders; Electricity system operators; Media and opinion makers; Customers (non-
regulated activities); Suppliers; Business partners; People in the organization; The wider community; Local communities. 
Terna, in fact, sets out its commitment to each category, as well as the methods used to monitor and check the results. 
Ruling out an exhaustive textual analysis of the entire website, it was decided to explore the homepage menu to see if 
we could find, with just a couple of click-throughs, any documents of relevance that could shed light on these same values. 
Indeed, this proved an easy route to not only the company profile and the financial statements, but also to the Code of 
Ethical Conduct, the Report on Sustainability, human resource policies, and corporate governance systems (in pdf or html 
format). The content is almost always rich and appealing; some of it is even in multimedia format, such as the interactive 
financial statements of SNAM or the Terna website’s streaming of Professor Freeman’s video, the scholar who developed 
the theory of stakeholders. In addition, all the companies make active use of the most popular social media. 
In short, while acknowledging the fact that the results of this analysis rely significantly on the structure and the quality of 
the websites visited, as well as the business in which the specific company operates (usually to serve a vast market), our 
findings indicate that none of the companies have a clear and explicit public mission and that the public commitment of 
the panel investigated mainly revolves around their CSR activities. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that corporate 
communications are unidirectional by definition, regardless of the methods and tools used. In other words, the chorus is 
incomplete, and other ‘voices’ (those of the stakeholders in primis) are needed to understand and show how these 
companies actually translate their stated principles into concrete behaviours and practice. We should bear in mind, also, 
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that some of these players have a history tainted by unresponsive behaviour, the impact of which had global 
repercussions. 
 
5.3   SOEs as providers of universal services 
The passage from the vertically integrated monopoly towards more de-regulated market shifted some functions related 
to the public mission towards different actors of the regulation and relied on different instruments. The concept of 
Universal Service Obligation (USO) has been introduced at the European level to concretely translate the concept of public 
mission in relation to the delivery of services that would not be spontaneously provided by the market otherwise. The 
liberalization of service markets itself helped to redefine the universal service in the different sectors.  
For instance, in the electricity sector ENEL does not formally receive from the State any compensation for the USO. At 
the same time, the issue of consumer protection has been tackled by establishing the Acquirente Unico SpA (Single 
buyer), a subsidiary of GSE indirectly controlled by the Treasury, is vested by law with the public mission of procuring 
continuous, secure, efficient and reasonably-priced electricity supply for households and small businesses. Acquirente 
Unico buys electricity in the market on the most favourable terms and resells it to distributors or retailers of the standard 
offer market (“mercato di maggior tutela”) for supply to small consumers who did not switch to the open market.  Finally, 
the AEEG determines the prices for energy acquired via the AU. Hence, we can say that in the energy sector the public 
goals are not implemented through regulated markets and public subsides. 
Nonetheless, the public interest can be pursued through other instruments. For example, in 2008 a “social tariff” has 
been introduced by legislation. Moreover, law n. 239/2004 delegates the national government to regulate issues of 
energy security. another indirect contribution to the public interest may lay in the initiatives of  the Ministry of Economic 
Development aimed at the development of Resource and Development activities through some joint ventures to be 
financed with three year agreements. 
In the gas sector, the obligation to provide a “safeguard regime” (in Italian servizio di tutela) only remains for a particular 
category of domestic clients since 2013 (see laws n. 125/2007; n. 69/2013; AEEG del. n. 280/2013/R/gas and 
457/2013/R/gas). 
In railway transports, Italy decentralized the system for USO (Di Giulio 2011). The USO is financed with transfers from the 
State to the Regions, which award concessions for the operation of regional transports. Overall, Trenitalia receives circa 
€2 bn a year – inclusive of regional integrative funds – for carrying out local mobility services. The instrument to regulate 
this system is the regional service contract between the Region and the railway operator who holds the concession. 
Similar contracts, but of lesser value, have been introduced also for some non-profitable freight and long distances 
passenger services, which the Department of Transport has directly awarded to Trenitalia. 
In postal services, Poste Italiane holds the concession for the Universal Service until 2026, as established through the EU 
and the Italian legislation (2008/6/CE, D.Lgs. 58/2011). The national regulatory agency AGCOM dictates the conditions 
for universal postal services with the deliberation n. 353/12/CONS AGCOM. The content and the financing of the Universal 
services are contained into a “program contract” between the Ministry of Economic Development and POSTE ITALIANE, 
under the supervision of the AGCOM that impinges on the monitoring of activities, the conditions of the service and the 
composition of compensations for the public service. This type of service contract is usually signed for three years and 
often extended in prorogation. 
A form of service contract also regulates the Universal Service as public broadcasting for television. The main issue relates 
to the awarding of the “Public Service”, the name that the Universal Service takes in the sector of broadcasting, paid 
mainly through television license fee. Therefore, the RAI receives the television license fees as the main compensation 
for some particular limitations to program schedule and reserved video time. The RAI is awarded the concession for the 
public service until 2016 and it is compelled to structure its programme schedule according to the service contract 
renegotiated every three years on paper with the Ministry of Economic Development.   
Overall, four different patterns emerge in relation to Universal Service Obligations and resulting subsides in our sample, 
for 2013. While FINMECCANICA, FINTECNA and STMelectronics do not benefit from direct service contracts, even though 
enterprises such as ENEL and ENI may rely on favorable conditions due the State direct intervention in the different 
countries. POSTE represents a case where the incidence of subsides on total revenues is irrelevant (343 millions from 
service contracts over 22,822). FS gains less than a half on service contracts (3,000 out of 8,329), while the RAI basically 
lives on the Universal Service Obligations, as the great part of its revenues comes from the general public (1,755 out of 
2,748).  
 
6.   Contemporary Italian SOEs: an economic assessment 
This section analyses the behaviour of Italian SOEs looking at the main economic and financial outcomes produced over 
the last decade. The main goal of this section is to understand whether the contemporary Italian SOEs have improved 
their performance and financial position; whether their strategies still differ from the private companies’ ones and 
whether they still achieve, though more softly or indirectly, an informal public mission. 
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In 2013 the value added of the top ten Italian SOEs corresponded to 4.5% of the Italian national GDP (table 5). Moreover, 
compared to the ten top Italian private enterprises, the 10 major Italian SOEs have higher operating revenues and assets, 
while they employee a lower number of workers. The assets of the ten major Italian SOEs is even higher than the 
aggregate level of assets of the Italian top 50 private enterprises (table 6). The reason behind their significant size in terms 
of assets and revenues is quite straightforward. Most of these SOEs provide primary services to a very large number of 
consumers. They mainly operate, though not exclusively, in sectors of general interest with features of network industry, 
where they still hold a dominant position and own a relevant market share.  
 
Table 5. The ten top Italian SOEs – Value added (bln euros, 2013) 
SOE name Value added 
Eni 26.002 
Enel 19.567 
Finmeccanica 5.392 
Poste Italiane 7.998 
FS 5.802 
Fintecna 1.031 
Snam  3.087 
RAI  1.187 
Terna  1.679 
Stmicroelectronics  0.655 
Total SOEs 72.399 
Total industry and services 1,423.104 
National GDP (current prices) 1,618.904 
SOEs on total industry and services 5.10% 
Total SOEs on national GDP 4.50% 
Source: own elaboration on Mediobanca 2014 and Amadeus 
 
 
Table 6. Top ten public enterprises in Italy (thousand euros, 2013) 
Enterprise Sector Turnover Assets Employees 
ENEL Energy 80.54 164.15 71,394 
Sector weight 48% 57% 53% 
ENI Oil and Gas 116.93 138.29 73,171 
Sector weight 66% 83% 76% 
FERROVIE DELLO STATO ITALIANE Transportation 9.37 63.24 71,031 
Sector weight 32% 74% 52% 
FINMECCANICA Defense and security 17.03 29.03 63,355 
Sector weight  11% 15% 15% 
FINCANTIERI Construction 3.83 7.06 20,341 
Sector weight 2% 4% 5% 
POSTE ITALIANE Other public services 13.20 133.93 145,531 
Sector weight 74% 84% 76% 
RAI  Broadcasting 2.81 2.31 12,965 
Sector weight 26% 16% 48% 
SNAM Energy 4.11 24.18 6,034 
Sector weight 2% 8% 4% 
STMICROELECTRONICS Electronics 1.44 1.27 9,464 
Sector weight 10% 8% 16% 
TERNA - RETE ELETTRICA NAZIONALE Energy 1.99 14.88 3,465 
Sector weight 1% 5% 3% 
Top ten SOEs (sum) 251.23 578.33 476,751 
top ten private enterprises (sum) 213.84 331.99 676,980 
top fifty private enterprises (sum) 354.64 491.23 1,126,117 
top ten SOEs/top ten private enterprises 117% 174% 70% 
top ten SOEs/top fifty private enterprises 71% 118% 42% 
Source: own elaboration on Mediobanca 2014 and Amadeus 
 
What remains less clear concerns their economic performance and industrial strategy. In addition to being large, are 
these companies profitable? Have they improved their performance? Moreover, how do they behave compared to other 
private and public enterprises? In the next sections, we analyse the SOEs budget data and industrial strategies to infer 
whether their behaviour differs with respect to private enterprises and can somehow be linked to an informal public 
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mission. We first analyse whether modern Italian SOEs are profitable and what is their impact on the national public 
finances by comparing the dividends from the SOE to the central governments with the economic transfers from the 
governments to its SOEs (section 6.1). Then, we move to analyse whether and to which extent the Italian SOEs have 
internationalized, by expanding their business beyond national borders after markets have been liberalized. In this way 
we try to infer whether, after being reorganized and increasingly exposed to market incentives, modern SOEs show an 
improved entrepreneurial attitude (section 6.2). Next we analyse their approach towards the issue of employment: Are 
SOEs used by the government to support employment? Have they improved their labour productivity? Does their 
approach towards employment strongly diverge from their private benchmark?  (section 6.3) Then, we look at the level 
of investments by analysing the trend of their fixed assets, with a particular focus on investments in R&D (section 6.4).  
In particular, we will look at the SOEs balancing sheet data over the period 2004-2013, and we will compare them with some 
industry peers. As proper industry peers cannot be identified within the national domestic borders, we broaden our 
geographical scope of analysis and for each Italian SOE we look for some European industry-peers operating in the same 
sector of activity, and with comparable size in terms of total assets. We have chosen for each Italian SOE at least one 
private and one state-owned benchmark8, and they are reported in table A.1 of the Appendix I.  
 
6.1 Italian SOEs as economic players: profitability 
Traditional SOEs were widely found to be unprofitable, and the Italian SOEs did not represent an exception to this case. 
Their excessive and unsustainable burden on public finances were one of the main motives for promoting privatizations 
also in Italy. Are these arguments still valid after the Italian SOEs have reformed their corporate, legal and economic 
profile? We want to assess whether the modern Italian SOEs are still unprofitable and, in particular, what is their impact 
on the national public finances. In general, contemporary SOEs do not directly affect public finances anymore. After they 
have reformed their legal status, they face budget autonomy and the European State Aid rule strictly regulates and limits 
economic transfer from the States to enterprises. Nevertheless, as controlling shareholder, the State is entitled to receive 
an amount of dividends in proportion to the percentage of owned shares, while public finances are likely to decrease due 
to the transfer from the State to its SOEs by virtue of specific contracts for the provision of a universal service under no 
direct costs’ remuneration. We first compare the economic performance of the Italian SOEs with their industry peers first 
by looking at their average revenues, EBITDA and net profits. Aggregated data show that the Italian SOEs, on average, 
have earned over the period 2004-2013 positive net profits. In particular, we observe that SOEs and their State-owned 
benchmark face a comparable trend with respect to all the considered variables, though, on average, the former shows 
higher values than the latter. Conversely, before the financial crisis the private benchmark shows significantly higher 
revenues, EBITDA and profits than the Italian SOEs, while their values tend to converge after 2008. This suggests that the 
crisis has affected more private than SOEs.  
 
                                                          
8 We have not found a private benchmark for “Poste Italiane” since most of the postal services in EU is provided by a SOE, while we have not found an 
appropriate state-owned benchmark for the firm “Stmicroelectronics”. 
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Figure 4. Trend of Revenues, EBITDA and net profits – average yearly values (mln €)
 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus  
 
Profitability ratios allow for a better comparability among enterprises with different size. They confirm that, on average, 
the profitability of the Italian SOEs is aligned to their state-owned European peers and quite comparable with their 
European private peers.  
Disaggregated data at a firm level show some heterogeneity in the Italian SOEs profitability (see table A.2 in Appendix I). 
Notably, only those firms operating in the energy sectors – Eni, Enel, Terna and Snam – plus Poste Italiane show positive 
profit ratios over time. Conversely, FS and STmelectronics incurred in economic losses before 2008, while their profit 
ratios turned positive in the last period 2009-2013. In particular, FS’ profit increase has been mainly due to the entry into 
operation in 2007 of the High Speed network. The opposite occurred when looking at Finmeccanica and Fintecna, whose 
profits have declined after the economic crisis. Finally RAI shows negative data over the whole period.  
When comparing the Italian SOEs to their respective private and state-owned peers we observe that the Italian energy 
SOEs – Enel, Terna and Snam – show better or highly comparable profit ratios. In particular, those enterprises operating 
in the energy sectors, and in particular the grid/pipeline operators, have the highest profitability ratios.  Eni, Poste Italiane 
and Fincantieri show better values for just one of their peers, while the other Italian SOEs have a worse performance than 
both their private and public benchmarks.  
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Figure 5. Trend of profitability ratios – average yearly values 
 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus  
 
6.1.1 Dividends  
After having undergone some major reforms, Italian SOEs are on average profitable firms, with remarkable differences 
among firms and sectors. But how are these profits employed? To which extent are their kept inside the firm and used 
for investing in the future of the company or distributed among shareholders in the form of dividends? In this section we 
first focus on the Italian listed SOEs, as they are the most profitable ones, and we try to infer whether their dividend policy 
differs with respect to the private listed enterprises. For this purpose, we focus on their dividend yield over the period 
2009-2013: the ratio of the last annual dividend per share paid to shareholders and the share closing price. 
 
Table 7. Dividend Yield for Italian listed major SOEs 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009-2013 mean 
ENEL 7,1 7,4 7,3 5,9 4,8 6,5 
Eni 6,8 6,2 7,1 6,5 6,5 6,6 
Finmeccanica 4,0 4,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 
Snam 6,2 6,5 6,6 7,4 6,8 6,7 
STMicroelectronics 5,1 4,9 5,3 6,8 4,8 5,4 
TERNA 7,4 6,8 7,5 7,2 6,0 7,0 
Mean SOEs 6,1 6,1 5,6 5,6 4,8 5,7 
Mean top ten private firms 5,9 3,7 4,9 5,4 4,0 4,8 
Source: own elaboration on Mediobanca 
 
Over the period 2009-2013 the Italian SOEs granted a higher dividend yield than the top ten private companies listed on 
the Italian stock exchange. This suggests that some of the Italian SOEs, and the listed ones in particular, not only have 
turned into well performing and profitable firms; they also bring some relevant revenues to their shareholders. This also 
brings us to exclude that, when listed, the Italian SOEs behave in a significant different way from other private enterprises 
in terms of dividend policy. If anything, this suggests that Italian listed SOEs are instructed to distribute among their 
shareholders a high share of their positive profits in the form of dividends. The following table reports the amount of 
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dividends that the Italian listed have distributed to their controlling and minority shareholders over the period 2009-
2013. RAI and FS are not reported as they have not distributed dividends over the considered period. Data show that the 
Italian SOEs have distributed a higher amount of dividends than the top 30 private listed firms. On average, 2.4 bln €/year 
of dividends have been distributed to the public shareholder over the period 2009-2013. This points out that the control 
of some enterprises by the Italian central government ensures some positive economic returns and suggests that one of 
the driving motives for keeping these firms under public control is that these firms are profitable and bring to the State a 
non-negligible amount of economic entries which increase public finances. The opportunity costs of distributing dividends 
is given by a lower amount of profits which could be kept into the firms and that would improve the firm’s financial 
position (liquidity) allowing to develop long-term investments with a lower leverage position. If anything, this suggests 
that for the Italian listed SOEs the short-term dividend goal weights strongly. Thus, we have not found a clear evidence 
that, when listed, the Italian SOEs strongly diverge from private enterprises in terms of profit and dividends. 
 
Table 8. Distribution of dividends among controlling and minority shareholders (€ mln.) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009-2013  
ENI       
Controlling shareholder 1,097 1,097 1,142 1,178 1,200 5,714 
Total shareholders 4,079 4,188 4,371 4,118 3,986 20,741 
ENEL       
Controlling shareholder 734 823 764 441 382 3,144 
Total shareholders 2,351 2,675 2,483 1,452 1,273 10,233 
TERNA       
Controlling shareholder 114 126 126 120 120 606 
Total shareholders 381 421 422 402 402 2,028 
SNAM       
Controlling shareholder ‐ ‐ ‐ 424 326 750 
Total shareholders ‐ ‐ ‐ 845 845 1,690 
STMICROELECTRONICS       
Controlling shareholder 47 73 75 74 71 340 
Total shareholders 171 264 274 269 258 1,236 
FINMECCANICA       
Controlling shareholder 72 72 ‐ ‐ ‐ 143 
Total shareholders 237 237 ‐ ‐ ‐ 474 
POSTE ITALIANE             
Controlling shareholder 150 500 350 350 250 1,600 
Total shareholders 150 500 350 350 250 1600 
FINTECNA             
Controlling shareholder 30 30 30 100 100 290 
Total shareholders 30 30 30 100 100 290 
Total SOEs             
Controlling shareholder 2,244 2,721 2,487 2,263 2,123 11,837 
Total shareholders 7,399 8,315 7,930 6,691 6,269 36,602 
Weight controlling 
shareholder 
30% 33% 31% 34% 34% 32% 
Private enterprises listed on the Italian Stock exchange 
Controlling shareholder 1,067 876 1,089 1,651 1,040 5,723 
Total shareholders 3,396 3,177 3,214 3,363 2,526 15,676 
Weight of the controlling 
shareholder 
31% 28% 34% 49% 41% 37% 
Source: own elaboration on Mediobanca and firm annual reports 
 
We finally compare the revenues returned to the Italian governments in terms of dividends with the transfers made by 
the State to certain SOEs by virtue of specific program contracts or agreements for the provision of an universal service. 
We observe that over the period 2009-2013 the amount of transfer to the Italian SOEs which are subsidized to provide a 
universal service (FS and Poste Italiane) is comparable with the total amount of dividend distributed by the Italian SOEs. 
Nevertheless, only part of the dividends has been distributed to the public controlling shareholder, thus the government 
incurred over the period 2009-2013 in a deficit equal to 24 mln euros. Moreover, the firms receiving the public transfer 
are different from the firms who earn positive profits and have distributed those dividends to the government. This 
constitutes a kind of cross-subsidization among firms and sectors which brings us to distinguish those SOEs, which are 
listed, profitable and do not show significant differences with respect to private enterprises, from other enterprises, such 
as RAI, Poste Italiane and FS, which are unlisted, wholly controlled by the State, and mainly unprofitable. Indeed, RAI has 
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incurred in losses, while the positive net profits registered by Poste Italiane and FS in the last years are largely determined 
by the direct transfer they received from the government in terms of both current and capital assets. It is worth to 
mention that these firms are the most labor intensive ones and that, after their corporatization, they have improved their 
corporate organization and the quality of their management. Moreover, they have expanded their business into new and 
more profitable markets (high speed rail for FS and financial services for Poste Italiane). What can we infer is that these 
companies have the duty to provide a public service, and the related costs are mainly financed through direct transfers 
from the central government rather than being entirely passed through into final prices. Though assessing the quality of 
these services goes beyond the scope of this paper, this analysis has highlighted that both the services provided by this 
latter category of SOE and the way these services are financed can be linked to an informal public mission, which is the 
provision of a universal service financed through a cross-subsidization system.  
 
Table 9. Surplus and Deficit between transfers and dividends (€ mln.) 
  Transfer from Italian Government  Dividends By Italian SOEs  
Total 
Dividends –  
Total 
Transfers  
Dividends to  
– Transfers 
from the 
central 
government   Poste Italiane FS 
 
 All Shareholders   Controlling shareholder  
 
2009 682 9,134  7,399 2,244  -2,417 -7,572 
2010 489 5,806  8,315 2,721  2,020 -3,574 
2011 380 6,484  7,930 2,487  1,066 -4,377 
2012 360 7,559  6,691 2,263  -1,228 -5,656 
2013 350 5,228  6,269 2,123  691 -3,455 
Total  2,261 34,211  36,602 11,837  130 -24,635 
Source: own elaboration on Mediobanca, Aida, Arrigo and Di Foggia 2013; 2014; FS and Poste balance sheets data 
6.2 Italian SOEs as global players: Internationalization. 
As discussed above, for SOEs profit-oriented activities rapidly grew in values and strategic importance. SOEs used to hold 
a monopolistic position in their domestic markets. Recently, market liberalization gave as well to SOEs the opportunity to 
explore new business opportunities in a global scenario. They have been increasingly playing an active role in the financial 
markets and to diversify their business and expand internationally though cross-border M&As. In particular, Italian SOEs 
have been quite active players in the Market for Corporate Control. We have recorded 327 deals between 1997 and 2014. 
This activity has increased before the financial crisis, and then it declined. 
 
Figure 6. Number of M&As performed by Italian SOEs in the new millennium 
 
Source: own elaboration on Zephyr 
 
Eni, Enel and Finmeccanica are the most active Italian SOEs in the market for corporate control. Together, they cover 
more than 70% of these deals. Respectively, 57%, 48% and 36% of their deals targeted firms outside Italy. While the 
internationalization of ENI and FINMECCANICA is not a recent phenomenon, ENEL used to operate only within domestic 
borders. Thus, the pattern of M&As performed by ENEL is informative on how ENEL has re-oriented its business strategies 
by looking at new expanding markets and facing the challenge of competition in a globalized scenario. The ENEL’s 
internationalization has been a radical change, boosted by the takeover of ENDESA, the Spanish power incumbent with a 
leading position in Latin America. Today, the Group serves approximately 61.5 million power and gas customers in 40 
countries worldwide (Soda et al. 2012). 
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Interestingly, also FS, Snam and Terna have expanded their economic activities beyond the Italian borders, consistently 
with the increased geographical scope and European integration of the markets where they respectively operate. In 
particular, FERROVIE DELLO STATO recently internationalized mainly in the German market with NETINERA for passengers 
and with TX LOGISTICS for freight.  Conversely, Poste Italiane, RAI, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and Fintecna have performed 
a lower amount of M&As, and mainly at a domestic level.  
 
Table 10. Domestic and cross-border M&As by the Italian major SOEs 
  
Domestic 
M&A 
Crosss-border 
 M&As 
Share of  
cross-border deals 
Target  
countries  
Cdp 12 4 25% AT, GB, NL 
Enel 47 44 48% 
BG, CL, DE, DZ, ES, FR, GR, NL, PA, RO, RU, SK, SV, 
TR, US 
Eni 36 48 57% 
BE, BR, CH, CZ, DE, DZ, ES, FR, GB, HU, IN, IR, NG, 
NL, NO, PL, PT, SK, TR, UA, US, VG 
Finmeccanica 39 22 36% ES, FR, GB, LY, MY, NL, RU, TR, US 
Fintecna 10 0 0% - 
FS 3 6 67% DE, FR 
Poste Italiane 11 1 8% RU 
RAI 2 0 0% - 
Snam 16 7 30% AR, BE, GB, GR 
Terna 17 8 47% BR, ME, SM, DE 
Total 185 134 42%  
Source: own elaboration on Zephyr 
 
A look at the corporate re-organization through subsidiaries controlled by each SOE confirms the SOEs’ expansion in the 
global arena. The number and percentage of subsidiaries held abroad in different countries confirm that Eni and 
Finmeccanica are highly internationalized, as 80% of their subsidiaries are located out of Italy, respectively in 53 and 37 
foreign countries and various continents. Even more interestingly, firms that used to operate within domestic borders, 
such as Enel, Terna, Snam and FS, have caught the opportunity of market liberalization to expand their business abroad. 
While ENEL has become a global player, owning subsidiaries also in North America and Latin America, Snam Terna and FS 
have mainly expanded in Europe, where markets have been increasingly integrated bringing domestic players to compete 
in an enlarged scenario. 
 
Table 11. Domestic and foreign subsidiaries controlled by the Italian major SOEs 
Company 
Domestic 
Subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries 
abroad 
Foreign Countries 
 N N % N°  
Enel 17 25 60% 7 (BE BR CA CL ES NL US) 
Eni 71 347 83% 
53 (AE AO AR AT AU BE BM BR BS CA CG CH CN CY CZ DE DO DZ EC EG ES FR GA 
GB GR HU ID IE IN IQ KW KZ LU LY MA MZ NG NL NO PG PL PT QA RO SA SG SI 
TN TT UA UG US VE) 
Fincantieri 23 14 38% 8 (AE BE BR DK IN NL NO US) 
Finmeccanica 75 288 79% 
37 (AE AR AU BE BR BW CA CH CN DE ES FR GB HK HU IE IN KZ LK LU LY MU MX 
MY NL PL PT QA RO RU SA SE TR UA US VE ZA) 
FS 22 67 75% 8 (AT BE CH DE DK FR NL SE) 
Poste Italiane 41 2 5% 2 (BR DK) 
RAI 11 3 21% 2 (FR US) 
Snam 11 5 31% 3 (BE FR NL) 
Stm 9 1 10% 1 (MT) 
Terna  5 8 62% 5 (BE DE ME SM TN) 
Source: own elaboration on Aida 
 
Next, we assess which part of the SOEs’ revenues and employees refers to domestic or foreign markets. We focus on the 
Italian listed SOEs which have shown a higher propensity towards internationalization and we compare them with the 
top 30 private companies listed on the Italian stock exchange. Interestingly, we find that the Italian listed SOEs generate 
more than 50% of their revenues outside Italy. STMicroelectronics and Finmeccanica operate mainly abroad and their 
foreign revenues represent respectively 98% and 80% of their total revenues. On average, their share of cross-border 
revenues is highly comparable with the ones by the top private listed Italian enterprises, which show a high degree of 
internationalization. Conversely, the core business of network operators and basic service providers, such as Poste 
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Italiane, FS, Snam, RAI and Terna is still mainly focus on the domestic market, though they own some assets even outside 
Italy, and they do not report significant data on cross-border reveneus. 
 
Table 12. Domestic and cross-border revenues (€ mln.) 
  Domestic Revenues Cross-border Revenues 
Share of cross-border 
revenues (%) 
 2009 2012 2013 2009 2012 2013 2009 2012 2013 
Enel 30,739 32,695 32,566 31,759 50,004 44,692 51 61 58 
Eni  27,950 33,998 32,044 55,277 93,222 82,678 66 73 72 
Finmeccanica 3,975 3,119 2,829 14,201 14,099 13,204 78 82 82 
Snam 2,438 3,405 3,416 0 0 0 ‐ ‐ ‐ 
STMicroelectronics 11 26 20 927 1,327 1,403 99 98 99 
Terna 1,317 1,724 1,839 0 0 0 ‐ ‐ ‐ 
Total SOEs 66,430 74,967 72,714 102,164 158,652 141,977 61 68 66 
Private listed corporations 63,617 55,995 52,784 91,770 176,697 175,561 59 76 77 
Source: own elaboration on Zephyr and Mediobanca 
 
Part of the share of cross-border revenues is export-driven, thus the comparison between domestic and cross-border 
employees gives a clearer information about the degree of firms' internationalization through 
delocalization/relocalization.  Enel and Eni show highly comparable shares of cross-border revenues and cross-border 
employees. This points out that they have effectively internationalized and expanded their business by delocalizing plants 
and activities beyond the national borders. Since they employee more than 50% of their employees outside Italy, it is 
difficult to argue that they have been following a clear public mission in terms of employment policies. Conversely, in the 
case of Finmeccanica the share of cross-border revenues doubles the share of cross-border employees. This implies that 
a relevant part of their cross-border revenues is export driven, as its manufacturing activity is mainly based in Italy. 
 
Table 13. Domestic and cross-border employees 
  Domestic employees Cross-border employees 
Share of cross-border 
employees (%) 
  2009 2012 2013 2009 2012 2013 2009 2012 2013 
Enel 38,121 36,114 34,269 43,087 37,588 37,125 53 51 52 
Eni  35,085 26,804 26,782 42,633 51,034 55,507 55 66 68 
Finmeccanica 43103 39771 37663 29953 27637 26172 41 41 41 
Snam 6,307 6,067 6,034 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Terna 3,447 3,433 3,442 0 3 3 0 0 0 
Total SOEs 126,063 112,189 108,190 115,673 116,262 118,807 48 51 52 
Private listed corporations 229,798 222,106 222,334 280,777 419,155 419,217 55 65 65 
Source: own elaboration on Zephyr and Mediobanca 
 
6.3 Italian SOES as employers 
In this section we try to gain further insights on the SOEs’ approach towards employment. We observe that the Italian 
SOEs are on average quite aligned to their private European benchmarks in terms of number of employees and labor 
costs, while they show lower value than their state-owned European peers. In detail, the number of workers employed 
by Italian SOEs has decreased over time (-11% from 2004 to 2013 from 41,858 to 37,140), while labor costs have grown 
by 12%. The same trends, though more pronounced, can be observed for the European state-owned firms. As a result, 
the Italian SOEs’ labor costs per employee show an increasing trend over the period 2004-2013, though on average they 
are lower than their private and public European peers. This brings us to exclude the risk that the central government has 
interfered with the management of their controlled firms to support employment, as it used to take place in the past 
decades. 
We also look at some “per employee ratios” as a proxy for the labor productivity. Figure 8 shows that, on average, over 
the period 2004-2013, labor costs cover 22% of the operating revenues for the Italian SOEs – in between the values 
registered by the public benchmark (25%) and the private benchmark (18%) – and they show a declining trend mainly 
due to their revenues’ increase over time. For the same reason, also operating revenues per employee increase over 
time, like in their benchmark cases. Moreover, the Italian SOEs and their private industry peers have on average similar 
profits per employee and both show a declining trend over time, as the number of employees decreases more than their 
profits.  In terms of labour productivity we do not find significant differences among firms depending on their ownership 
nature. 
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Figure 7. Number of employees, labor costs and labor costs per employee 
 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus 
 
Figure 8. Labor costs ratios and employee ratios 
 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus 
 
These data do not show strong divergences among the Italian SOEs and their industry peers in terms of employment 
policies and productivity. To gain more insights we first focus on the Italian SOEs and then we compare each of them with 
their respective private and state-owned peers (see table A.3 in Appendix I). 
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First it should be noticed that the postal service is the most labor intensive service, followed by the rail service. In Italy, 
while the number of people employed by Poste Italiane and the related labor costs have increased over time, they have 
instead declined in the case of FS. Interestingly, FS shows lower labor costs per employee than its European peers. 
Moreover, the ratio between the labor costs and revenues is highest in the case of FS (higher than its peers and other 
Italian SOEs), though it has significantly declined over time as a consequence of a management more aligned to the 
private standards. Among the other SOEs, Poste Italiane, RAI, Finmeccanica and STM show higher percentage of labor 
costs over revenues. Conversely, Enel, Eni, Snal and Terna the highest operating revenues and profits per employee, 
mainly because they are capital intensive sectors. Notably, the firms operating in the energy sectors are highly 
comparable of slightly better than their respective peers and the same holds for Poste Italiane and Finmeccanica. 
Conversely, FS, RAI and Stmicroelectronics are worse than their respective peers.  
 
6.4 Italian SOEs as investors 
The trend of assets is quite informative about the type of investments undertaken by various companies. In particular, 
we observe that Italian SOEs on average behave more likely to their public industry peers than to the private ones in 
terms of investments. Indeed, both the Italian SOEs and their state-owned industry peers have increased their 
investments in tangible assets over time, the former more than the latter. Their long-term strategies do not seem strongly 
influenced by the financial crisis. Conversely, the private industry peers have significantly reduced their tangible assets 
during the financial crisis, while increasing them in the new decade. Concerning the intangible assets, state-owned and 
private enterprises show opposite trends. State-owned firms have increased their investments in intangible assets during 
the first decade of the 2000s, while reducing after the European economic recession. Conversely, private enterprises 
have divested until 2010, while increasing their investments in the new decade. In 2013, the level of intangible assets is 
quite comparable among SOEs and private counterparts. Similarly, Italian SOES and their public European peers on 
average have increased their financial assets, while privates have lowered them over time. 
 
Figure 9. Average tangible, intangible and current assets (bln €) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus 
 
The firm detail confirms that the energy and the rail sectors are the most capital intensive ones. Notably, FS, Enel and Eni 
have significantly higher fixed assets than the other Italian SOEs. Enel and Eni have increased over time their investments 
in tangible assets in correspondence with their increased internationalization. Conversely FS has significantly lowered its 
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tangible assets9. Enel has the highest amount of intangible assets, followed by Eni, Finmeccanica and Snam. Poste Italiane 
shows the highest and fastest increasing amount of financial assets, mainly as a consequence of its increased activity of 
savings’ collection through its subsidiary Bancoposta, followed by Eni, Enel and FS which have increased their shares and 
credits in other enterprises during the first decade of the 2000s (see table A.4 in appendix I). 
 
6.4.1 Italian SOEs as promoters of R&D 
A look at the firms’ attitude towards R&D investments can be informative about the SOEs informal public mission. 
Amadeus does not provide systematic information on the firms’ R&D expenses. Therefore, for the Italian SOEs we have 
extracted this information directly from the enterprises’ yearly balance sheets (as reported by AIDA in the firm report 
section). Unfortunately, the high number of missing values does not allow to develop a comparative analysis with the 
public or private benchmarks. Thus, we focus only on the Italian SOEs. Within this group data are not available for 
STmicroelectronics, while Terna and Finmeccanica report data since 2009. Available data are quite heterogeneous and 
show different trends among Italian SOEs. At the end of 2013, Eni, Enel, Finmeccanica and RAI show comparable levels 
of R&D and patent expenses. In the new decade, Snam, Terna, Enel and Poste Italiane have increased their investments 
in R&D, while ENI, while after the crisis FS, Finmeccanica and ENI have lowered them.  
Important differences concern the type of R&D investments as well. This voice refers almost exclusively to the holding of 
patents when looking at Enel, Poste Italiane, RAI, Snam and Terna, while it refers to other types of R&D investments for 
the rest of Italian SOEs. Finally, we observe that almost all companies invest in R&D between 1 and 3% of their operating 
revenues. This percentage increases to 7% and to 20% for Terna and RAI respectively. 
 
Figure 10. R&D investments by Italian major SOEs 
 
Source: own elaboration from AIDA 
 
                                                          
9 We believe this change is accounting-based and it derives by the adoption of the international standards IAS / IFRS. Indeed, in these years FS has not 
divested its assets nor it has sold some of its subsidiaries. Conversely, the length of the rail network has slightly increased from 16,686 to 16,704 km. 
The reduction in the value of the FS' tangible assets by 23 bln € has corresponded to a reduction of the risks fund by 25 bln €. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper has provided an analysis of behavioural and institutional features concerning the most important among 
contemporary Italian SOEs. Although these corporations have very different organizational legacies and face 
heterogeneous and often idiosyncratic markets some general trends can be drawn.  
A first overarching finding concerns the size and the scope of Italian state capitalism. To this respect, it can be said that, 
after major retreat from specific sectors such as Telecommunication and Motorways, occurred in the late 1990s, State 
direct intervention in the economy through publicly controlled companies remained a stable feature. In second place, 
with the sole exception of the national broadcasting company, RAI, Italian SOEs underwent a deep restructuring of both 
their structures and strategies toward models which are peculiar of the private sector in terms of corporate structure and 
orientation to profitability. 
Nonetheless, with respect to this latter dimension, the sample of corporations examined also highlighted relevant 
differences. On the one hand, in fact, the national champions of energy such as ENI and ENEL and the aerospace 
manufacturer FINMECCANCA underwent the most radical transformation, in line (and because of) with the deep 
restructuring of the market they face, which are becoming even more deregulated and internationalized. They have been 
partially privatized and listed on the stock market, even if the State still maintain controlling power. Moreover, the gas 
and electricity grids, respectively SNAM and TERNA, once vertically integrated to ENI and ENEL, have been recently 
unbundled, listed on the stock market and put under the control of CDP.  
Conversely, companies such as FINTECNA, POSTE and FS underwent a more smooth transformation. They in fact has been 
only corporatized, since the State so far has kept 100% stakes. Moreover, these companies have faced a more stable and 
protected business environment, often characterized by highly subsidized sectors, as in the case of railway services. 
Nonetheless, also in these cases, the corporate strategies is becoming more business-oriented as they started to mark 
profits. In the last decade, POSTE has strongly diversified its activities, becoming a relevant player in the market of 
financial services and even a traditionally loss-making corporation such as FS started to internationalize its activities, as it 
is stably present in the rich and competitive German market. Also within FINTECNA, the last of IRI’s manufacture assets 
kept by the State, recent reshufflings has been implemented since FINCANTERI, its main subsidiary, has been listed in the 
stock market in 2014 and has recently obtained two large orders, respectively from the Italian Marine and the MSC 
shipping company, amounting to €5bn. 
In parallel with the emerging market orientation of main SOEs, the paper highlighted a general weakening of the 
“publicness” of these corporations. No specific mention to public goals can in fact be traced in their statutes. Of course, 
Italian SOEs provide the large majority of universal services and normally carry out environmental, cultural or social 
projects, alone or in partnership with third sector organizations. This, nonetheless, does not represent a distinctive 
characteristic of public enterprises, as also privately owned companies are often involved (and benefit from) such 
activities. 
If one of the direction undertook by Italian state capitalism, thus, seems to be that of a profit-oriented conversion of 
SOEs, less certain is so far what the state is intended to do with its ownership rights. On the one hand, in fact, all the last 
national executives have expressed their commitment to further privatize SOEs and some steps in this direction have 
been made. The Treasury stakes in ENI, ENEL and FINMECCANICA have been constantly diluted over time, and further 
divestiture are constantly announced. Moreover, since a couple of years, the privatization of POSTE and FS has been 
announced and is currently under review. 
From another perspective, State’s direct intervention proved to be stable. Much of Treasury divestments have been in 
fact absorbed by CDP, which in turn is controlled by the Treasury. Moreover, this financial body is day by day more active 
in PPP investment projects in which, nonetheless the public stake often outnumbers the involvement of private partners. 
In the weeks while this paper has been drafted (may-june 2015), in fact, the national government is preparing an 
investment project to finance the extension of internet broadband and the possible re-nationalization of ILVA is raising 
criticism about the limits of State intervention in recovering industrial failures. 
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Appendix I 
 
Table A.1. List of private and state-owned industry peers 
  Country Sector of activity 
State-
owned* 
N° of 
subsidiaries 
Total Assets 
mean  
2004-2013 
(mln €) 
Enel Italy 
Energy 
1 806 123.0 
E.On Germany 0 1072 135.0 
EdF France 1 1226 211.0 
ENI  Italy 
Oil and gas 
1 591 118.0 
Total France 0 1201 131.0 
GDF Suez France 1 2260 127.0 
Snam Italy 
Transport via 
pipeline 
1 20 17.2 
National Grid GAS UK 0 10 21.2 
Grtgaz France 1 4 5.7 
Terna Italy 
Transmission of 
electricity 
1 16 9.9 
Red Electrica De Espana  Spain 0 6 7.7 
Alliander Netherlands 1 43 9.5 
FS Italy 
Rail transport 
1 89 79.0 
Network Rail  UK 0 15 48.4 
Deutsche Bahn Germany 1 782 30.2 
Soc. Nat. des Chemins De Fer France 1 689 42.8 
Poste Italiane Italy 
Postal activities  
1 43 82.0 
Die Schweizerische Post  Switzerland 1 76 59.9 
Deutsche Post  Germany 1 1229 180.0 
LA Poste France 1 153 170.0 
RAI  Italy 
Broadcasting 
activities 
1 13 2.6 
Mediaset Italy 0 40 6.9 
France Televisions France 1 25 2.1 
Finmeccanica Italy 
Manufacture of air 
and spacecraft  
1 517 27.9 
BAE Systems United Kingdom 0 790 26.7 
Thales France 1 299 17.9 
Fincantieri Italy 
Building of ships 
and floating 
structures 
1 95 3.9 
Azimut - Benetti. Italy 0 19 0.8 
Navantia SA Spain 1 8 4.5 
D C N S France 1 25 7.3 
Stmicroelectronics Italy R&D natural 
sciences and 
engineering 
1 9 1.8 
Infineon Technologies Bipolar Germany 0 2 0.1 
NXP Semiconductors France 0 0 0.1 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus *The value equals 1 when the firm is state-owned and zero otherwise; **The value equals 1  
when the firm is listed and zero otherwise 
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In the following table, we report the pre-crisis and post-crisis average value of various profitability indexes.  
Table A.2 Italian SOEs, private and state-owned benchmarks. Profitability ratios. Average values for the periods 2004-2008 
and 2009-2013 
  ROE ROA ROCE EBITDA margin Profit margin 
  04-08 09-13 04-08 09-13 04-08 09-13 04-08 09-13 04-08 09-13 
Enel 16.7 12.1 5.3 3.2 9.7 7.6 23.3 21.9 13.4 9.8 
EdF 16.7 9.4 2.0 1.2 6.4 4.6 26.7 23.6 8.4 6.1 
E.On 11.6 12.4 4.4 3.8 7.2 6.5 15.3 12.0 10.6 6.7 
ENI  20.6 10.9 9.9 4.9 14.7 7.7 27.2 23.0 20.2 13.5 
Total 29.0 15.5 11.2 6.5 18.3 9.9 22.2 18.5 18.2 14.0 
GDF Suez 11.8 1.2 4.2 0.4 8.9 2.8 20.6 17.6 10.9 3.8 
Snam 12.5 13.1 4.7 3.9 7.7 7.5 71.2 68.3 38.7 39.4 
National Grid GAS 7.2 13.2 2.2 4.3 5.7 6.9 51.0 61.2 21.1 33.3 
Grtgaz -11.1 3.8 -6.7 1.9 5.0 3.8 50.8 47.4 30.0 25.5 
Terna 16.0 19.9 4.8 4.8 8.9 7.7 67.1 74.0 41.8 43.5 
Red Electrica De Espana  9.1 29.6 2.2 5.1 4.3 9.5 65.2 72.5 31.9 39.4 
Alliander 15.0 9.0 6.7 3.6 10.1 - 21.7 32.0 14.7 18.5 
FS -1.7 0.7 -0.7 0.4 -0.1 1.1 13.6 18.9 -5.9 3.6 
Deutsche Bahn 8.6 7.2 3.0 3.7 6.1 5.8 3.1 10.9 34.4 48.5 
Soc Nat Des Chemins De fer 13.1 0.8 1.8 0.2 5.1 1.3 7.8 8.3 1.8 - 
Network Rail  7.7 8.6 1.4 1.3 5.7 4.8 43.9 53.6 13.5 9.4 
Poste Italiane 11.7 22.7 1.1 0.9 4.7 2.4 15.8 7.8 8.9 7.8 
Die Schweizerische Post  105.5 23.3 1.5 1.0 42.7 17.2 13.6 14.5 10.4 10.6 
Deutsche Post  8.8 11.3 0.7 3.3 4.5 11.8 8.7 6.8 3.6 3.0 
LA Poste 19.1 9.2 0.6 0.3 8.7 5.0 7.0 9.7 3.5 - 
RAI  -0.3 -22.0 0.0 -3.2 0.2 -5.2 23.7 21.7 2.6 -0.9 
France Televisions 1.0 -2.1 0.0 -0.7 2.7 -0.4 5.6 6.5 0.3 0.2 
Mediaset 20.1 4.3 10.5 2.0 17.8 5.8 51.9 40.5 25.4 6.1 
Finmeccanica 12.4 -10.1 2.5 -1.1 11.9 1.9 10.3 4.9 7.4 -3.6 
BAE Systems 17.8 16.4 4.0 3.1 19.1 17.1 10.8 12.6 6.6 5.4 
Thales 18.2 7.0 3.1 1.2 11.4 5.2 8.4 6.5 5.2 1.9 
Fincantieri 6.7 -1.9 1.1 -0.6 6.1 0.4 6.4 1.7 4.0 -1.4 
Navantia SA -22.3 -42.7 -1.3 -1.3 -1.1 1.4 -5.8 -6.1 -6.5 -7.4 
D C N S 39.5 13.6 2.3 1.9 15.2 9.6 9.0 6.2 9.0 - 
Azimut - Benetti. 16.5 -3.6 5.2 -1.0 14.9 -0.6 12.8 4.9 9.2 -1.2 
Stmicroelectronics -2.9 2.0 -1.7 1.5 -1.3 2.7 18.9 12.4 -1.0 1.9 
Infineon Technologies Bipolar 7.1 8.6 4.6 6.0 5.5 6.9 7.7 12.3 3.8 6.1 
NXP Semiconductors -  16.7 -92.9 9.4 -255.0 33.9 6.2 8.7 -2.7 4.5 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus  
ROE=(Net income / Shareholder funds) * 100; ROA= (Net income / Total Assets) * 100; ROCE= ((Net income + Interest paid) / 
(Shareholder funds + Non current liabilities) * 100; Profit margin=(Profit before tax / Operating revenue) * 100; EBITDA margin=(EBITDA 
/ Operating revenue) * 100 
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Table A.3. Selected enterprises’ per employee ratios 
 Labor cost per empl. Labor costs/Op. Rev. Op. Rev. Per empl. Net Profits per empl. 
 04-08 09-13 04-08 09-13 04-08 09-13 04-08 09-13 
Enel 52.0 61.0 8.1 6.5 648.5 958.7 86.9 91.0 
EdF 59.5 71.5 16.3 15.5 366.9 464.3 31.8 28.1 
E.On 59.3 65.2 6.6 4.2 914.6 1,621.1 91.6 89.9 
ENI  51.7 64.9 4.4 4.7 1,193.7 1,415.0 240.5 187.1 
Total 60.0 69.0 4.7 4.4 1,320.3 1,606.6 238.4 223.8 
GDF Suez 49.3 51.5 10.9 13.4 469.7 379.8 52.6 26.4 
Snam 58.4 61.7 6.9 10.0 854.8 616.0 329.0 241.8 
National Grid GAS 52.7 57.5 11.7 9.8 453.7 588.6 97.9 197.2 
Grtgaz 62.5 86.2 11.9 14.5 542.7 603.7 167.7 157.2 
Terna 66.0 73.3 17.3 14.8 380.5 495.0 158.9 216.7 
Red Electrica De Espana  66.3 71.3 8.3 7.6 795.7 946.1 253.6 371.3 
Alliander 56.1 113.4 9.9 29.5 575.1 331.3 85.5 76.1 
FS 48.3 53.2 47.3 44.7 100.3 119.4 -7.0 4.5 
Deutsche Bahn 71.8 88.1 22.9 18.1 317.0 493.2 171.3 375.1 
Soc Nat Des Chemins De fer   42.0 39.1     
Network Rail  57.3 58.1 28.0 27.1 207.4 215.2 30.0 20.8 
Poste Italiane 36.2 40.4 38.0 28.6 100.3 142.0 9.1 11.0 
Die Schweizerische Post  52.1 63.5 46.9 46.4 110.9 136.8 11.6 14.8 
Deutsche Post  37.9 36.3 30.0 30.5 126.8 119.1 4.5 3.6 
LA Poste   59.5 61.2     
RAI  73.9 77.1 30.3 33.7 244.7 224.2 5.2 -1.8 
France Televisions   27.9 28.4     
Mediaset 87.4 96.6 11.7 14.0 820.5 698.3 185.8 47.4 
Finmeccanica 58.5 67.2 24.6 25.1 238.0 267.7 17.3 -9.1 
BAE Systems 64.8 71.4 30.0 28.7 217.2 249.2 14.6 13.2 
Thales     196.9 206.4 10.3 3.9 
Fincantieri 46.8 48.2 17.0 19.8 275.8 247.2 10.6 -4.2 
Navantia SA 50.8 54.6 23.6 27.4 218.3 217.4 -13.0 -14.2 
D C N S   13.3      
Azimut - Benetti. 42.2 42.0 10.4 14.9 408.2 280.5 37.2 -3.8 
Stmicroelectronics 47.0 54.6 28.2 35.5 160.0 159.3 874.3 6.8 
Infineon Technologies Bipolar 43.0 55.6 14.7 18.5 290.0 304.8 11.0 19.8 
NXP Semiconductors 58.4 92.9 28.0 49.3 208.3 190.6 -5.6 8.0 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus 
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Table A.4. Assets’ composition by Italian SOEs and their public and private European industry peers 
  Enel EdF E.On 
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 87,0 168,0 178,0 244,0 133,0 142,0 
Tangible  50% 48% 58% 49% 35% 39% 
Intangible 16% 22% 5% 7% 15% 16% 
Financial 5% 5% 10% 17% 17% 10% 
Current  29% 25% 27% 27% 32% 35% 
  ENI  Total GDF Suez 
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 97,4 138,0 106,0 156,0 66,6 187,0 
Tangible  49% 48% 38% 41% 41% 42% 
Intangible 5% 6% 4% 7% 19% 21% 
Financial 12% 11% 17% 14% 7% 8% 
Current  35% 35% 41% 38% 32% 30% 
  Snam National Grid GAS Grtgaz 
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 11,1 22,0 20,1 22,3 4,5 6,9 
Tangible  90% 66% 59% 61% 88% 90% 
Intangible 0% 17% 0% 1% 0% 2% 
Financial 5% 4% 38% 28% 0% 2% 
Current  5% 12% 10% 11% 12% 7% 
  Terna Red Electrica De Espana  Alliander 
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 7,2 12,7 5,5 8,2 11,8 7,3 
Tangible  72% 68% 91% 92% 54% 75% 
Intangible 4% 4% 0% 0% 3% 4% 
Financial 1% 4% 2% 1% 13% 10% 
Current  23% 25% 8% 6% 30% 11% 
  FS Deutsche Bahn Network Rail  
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 90,8 67,3 30,8 29,2 40,9 55,9 
Tangible  83% 77% 6% 0% 93% 90% 
Intangible 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Financial 1% 7% 81% 84% 4% 3% 
Current  14% 15% 13% 16% 4% 6% 
  Poste Italiane Die Schweizerische Post  Deutsche Post  
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 62,3 102,0 36,4 83,5 208,0 38,4 
Tangible  5% 3% 4% 2% 4% 17% 
Intangible 1% 1% 0% 0% 6% 32% 
Financial 31% 57% 66% 64% 0% 1% 
Current  63% 39% 30% 33% 90% 50% 
  RAI  France Televisions Mediaset 
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 2,6 2,5 2,2 2,1 6,3 7,4 
Tangible  24% 26% 20% 22% 7% 7% 
Intangible 36% 37% 5% 5% 50% 52% 
Financial 1% 1% 2% 2% 10% 12% 
Current  39% 36% 74% 71% 33% 28% 
 Finmeccanica BAE Systems Thales 
 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 25,6 30,3 26,5 26,9 15,6 20,2 
Tangible  10% 11% 9% 10% 7% 7% 
Intangible 19% 27% 43% 48% 17% 21% 
Financial 4% 3% 13% 10% 9% 9% 
Current  66% 60% 34% 31% 66% 63% 
  Fincantieri Navantia SA D C N S 
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 4,4 3,5 4,2 4,7 7,2 7,4 
Tangible  9% 18% 7% 6% 4% 7% 
Intangible 0% 6% 0% 0% 3% 7% 
Financial 6% 4% 39% 62% 0% 7% 
Current  84% 72% 55% 32% 91% 79% 
 Stmicroelectronics Infineon Technologies Bipolar NXP Semiconductors 
  2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 2004-08 2009-13 
Total Assets 2,2 1,4 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 
Tangible  59% 45% 14% 22% 19% 8% 
Intangible 0% 1% 31% 18% 33% 31% 
Financial 3% 9% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
Current  38% 45% 54% 60% 48% 61% 
Source: own elaboration on Amadeus 
 
